Is password entry being recorded on camera a realistic concern?











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I live in a city where CCTV camera coverage is comprehensive and increasing. Cameras are getting cheaper and higher resolution. Everyone has a video camera in their pocket already, and we are starting to see trends which indicate always-on cameras may become commonplace in other devices like glasses.



It has occurred to me, when out in public and entering my username/password into apps on my phone and laptop, that if a camera could capture both my screen and my keyboard, it could be fairly straightforward for a viewer to grab or guess my credentials from the footage assuming a high enough resolution image and the view not being (too) obscured.



Without going too much into the details of how it would be implemented, the accuracy and cost etc, I have a background in image processing and so am also aware that this would likely be automatable to at least some degree.



So I thought I would ask the community here if this is actually a viable risk? Have there been any known instances of it happening already? Are people thinking about this with respect to the viability of plaintext credential entry into apps in the long run?










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  • 31




    Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
    – stackzebra
    Nov 9 at 8:12






  • 19




    Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
    – Mindwin
    Nov 9 at 14:31








  • 4




    Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
    – Duncan X Simpson
    Nov 10 at 4:28






  • 2




    Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
    – Damon
    Nov 12 at 11:49








  • 3




    Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
    – usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
    Nov 12 at 16:22















up vote
144
down vote

favorite
15












I live in a city where CCTV camera coverage is comprehensive and increasing. Cameras are getting cheaper and higher resolution. Everyone has a video camera in their pocket already, and we are starting to see trends which indicate always-on cameras may become commonplace in other devices like glasses.



It has occurred to me, when out in public and entering my username/password into apps on my phone and laptop, that if a camera could capture both my screen and my keyboard, it could be fairly straightforward for a viewer to grab or guess my credentials from the footage assuming a high enough resolution image and the view not being (too) obscured.



Without going too much into the details of how it would be implemented, the accuracy and cost etc, I have a background in image processing and so am also aware that this would likely be automatable to at least some degree.



So I thought I would ask the community here if this is actually a viable risk? Have there been any known instances of it happening already? Are people thinking about this with respect to the viability of plaintext credential entry into apps in the long run?










share|improve this question


















  • 31




    Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
    – stackzebra
    Nov 9 at 8:12






  • 19




    Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
    – Mindwin
    Nov 9 at 14:31








  • 4




    Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
    – Duncan X Simpson
    Nov 10 at 4:28






  • 2




    Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
    – Damon
    Nov 12 at 11:49








  • 3




    Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
    – usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
    Nov 12 at 16:22













up vote
144
down vote

favorite
15









up vote
144
down vote

favorite
15






15





I live in a city where CCTV camera coverage is comprehensive and increasing. Cameras are getting cheaper and higher resolution. Everyone has a video camera in their pocket already, and we are starting to see trends which indicate always-on cameras may become commonplace in other devices like glasses.



It has occurred to me, when out in public and entering my username/password into apps on my phone and laptop, that if a camera could capture both my screen and my keyboard, it could be fairly straightforward for a viewer to grab or guess my credentials from the footage assuming a high enough resolution image and the view not being (too) obscured.



Without going too much into the details of how it would be implemented, the accuracy and cost etc, I have a background in image processing and so am also aware that this would likely be automatable to at least some degree.



So I thought I would ask the community here if this is actually a viable risk? Have there been any known instances of it happening already? Are people thinking about this with respect to the viability of plaintext credential entry into apps in the long run?










share|improve this question













I live in a city where CCTV camera coverage is comprehensive and increasing. Cameras are getting cheaper and higher resolution. Everyone has a video camera in their pocket already, and we are starting to see trends which indicate always-on cameras may become commonplace in other devices like glasses.



It has occurred to me, when out in public and entering my username/password into apps on my phone and laptop, that if a camera could capture both my screen and my keyboard, it could be fairly straightforward for a viewer to grab or guess my credentials from the footage assuming a high enough resolution image and the view not being (too) obscured.



Without going too much into the details of how it would be implemented, the accuracy and cost etc, I have a background in image processing and so am also aware that this would likely be automatable to at least some degree.



So I thought I would ask the community here if this is actually a viable risk? Have there been any known instances of it happening already? Are people thinking about this with respect to the viability of plaintext credential entry into apps in the long run?







passwords user-names






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asked Nov 8 at 15:42









davnicwil

801268




801268








  • 31




    Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
    – stackzebra
    Nov 9 at 8:12






  • 19




    Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
    – Mindwin
    Nov 9 at 14:31








  • 4




    Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
    – Duncan X Simpson
    Nov 10 at 4:28






  • 2




    Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
    – Damon
    Nov 12 at 11:49








  • 3




    Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
    – usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
    Nov 12 at 16:22














  • 31




    Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
    – stackzebra
    Nov 9 at 8:12






  • 19




    Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
    – Mindwin
    Nov 9 at 14:31








  • 4




    Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
    – Duncan X Simpson
    Nov 10 at 4:28






  • 2




    Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
    – Damon
    Nov 12 at 11:49








  • 3




    Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
    – usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
    Nov 12 at 16:22








31




31




Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
– stackzebra
Nov 9 at 8:12




Entering credentials in public is always a risk.
– stackzebra
Nov 9 at 8:12




19




19




Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
– Mindwin
Nov 9 at 14:31






Related: Snowden's Blanket - He wouldn't use the blanket if there was no risk of seeing him type.
– Mindwin
Nov 9 at 14:31






4




4




Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
– Duncan X Simpson
Nov 10 at 4:28




Take a look at TOTP - Time-based One Time Passwords. Typically used for 2FA, you can use them as the only factor as well. I have a few servers set up that accept either for SSH.
– Duncan X Simpson
Nov 10 at 4:28




2




2




Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
– Damon
Nov 12 at 11:49






Well, my bank will (against my explicit consent) pay up to 50€ per transaction without my card ever being inserted in a reader, only using some wireless transponder shit, and without any security token whatsoever being provided. So, seeing how my south Korean phone unlocks on my fingerprint and keeps my super important Instagram password hardware encrypted, I see password skimming as the smaller of two problems.
– Damon
Nov 12 at 11:49






3




3




Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
Nov 12 at 16:22




Who is your adversary in the threat model? Government has such plenties of cameras, but doesn't need you to disclose your password to spy on you.
– usr-local-ΕΨΗΕΛΩΝ
Nov 12 at 16:22










6 Answers
6






active

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up vote
170
down vote



accepted










Lots of examples. A high-profile and recent example is when Kanye was caught on camera entering his "00000" password to unlock his device.



Shoulder-surfing is one reason why applications do not display the password text on the screen, but show ****** instead.



And this is one reason why multi-factor authentication is so important; even if you know the password, you cannot use it without another factor.



I have even seen viable research into capturing the sound of the keyboard when a user types the password, even over the computer's microphone.



So, yes, you describe a viable risk that the industry has been addressing for a long time. The specifics of high-res cameras is just not a significant enough of a new factor to consider. Shoulder-surfing and keyloggers are a current risk.



The industry knows that it needs to develop something better than passwords, and there are many active attempts to do so, but nothing is mature or stable enough yet.






share|improve this answer



















  • 65




    I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 15:58






  • 11




    I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
    – davnicwil
    Nov 8 at 16:10






  • 4




    @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 16:38






  • 10




    @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
    – Doktor J
    Nov 8 at 20:30






  • 5




    @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 21:27


















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54
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As another example, here are some images from KrebsOnSecurity on ATM Skimmers (devices used to steal ATM credentials)





Camera 1Hidden camera behind ATM faceplate (source)



Camera 2Hidden camera glued to corner of ATM (source)



Camera 3Hidden camera on fake panel of ATM (source)





So yes, it is a very real-world concern.






share|improve this answer





















  • I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
    – fortunate_man
    Nov 10 at 13:44






  • 7




    @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
    – Ross Ridge
    Nov 10 at 16:28






  • 1




    I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
    – Wildcard
    Nov 12 at 18:39


















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Also, there have been cases reported where thermal imagers were used to extract a PIN or password from a keyboard just used to enter it - the hotter a key, if time of finger contact is about equal (heat soaks in...), the more recently it has been pressed. This might not present the password on a silver platter due to duplicate keys, different finger dwell times, but can extremely narrow the possible passwords.






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  • 25




    My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 11:02






  • 2




    @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
    – Ivan Kolmychek
    Nov 9 at 19:24








  • 2




    Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 19:46






  • 2




    @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
    – rackandboneman
    Nov 9 at 21:22






  • 4




    I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
    – Hagen von Eitzen
    Nov 10 at 10:15


















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11
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Something that may help: Get into the habbit of "pressing" a few buttons in addition to your password.



Say, your password is 1234. You could hit the 1 and 2, pretend to press, say, 9, and then continue your password.



It discourages any cameras, key-wear down, or onlookers. It's certainly low grade, yes, but it deters people who have 1000 other clips of footage to go through.






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Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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  • I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
    – ouflak
    2 days ago


















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Yes, and this is one of many reasons that you should not be entering passwords, and for the most part should not even know your passwords, except for a password manager master password and device unlock codes/FDE passphrases. For FDE passphrases, you should enter them only when powering on the device, and only in private locations where there are no cameras or observers present.






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  • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
    – Rory Alsop
    Nov 10 at 19:59


















up vote
8
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I would say yes, and high resolution imagery is not necessary. Speaking as a statistician, I don't even need to know the exact letter or numeral you touched (on a screen keyboard or regular keyboard), reducing each choice to 2 or 3 possible characters, based on the position of your fingers, makes an electronic guess of your password a tractable problem. Especially I would try likely combinations of letters that form word fragments; e.g. ([FR][EW][DE])="FEE", "FED", or "RED".



Or if numbers, I'd look for combinations that appear in numbers related to you: birthdays, anniversaries, for you, spouse, kids. Your phone number or house address.



On a screen or a real keyboard, I can see when you shift for special characters and guess what they are. And sometimes it is clear which key you hit, depending on the angle of the camera, narrowing some position to exactly one key. The camera can narrow the field of possible passwords considerably, and often in analysis that scores how well passwords match words and dates, the "right" password can be at the top of the scoring list.



For this reason, acronymic phrases can help defeat this. The idea is to memorize a phrase that means something to you, like "If the Seahawks win the championship I'll get drunk and dance a jig." Then make an Acronym: "ITSWTCIGDADAJ". You can teach yourself to replace some of these letters with numerals or special characters.



Without knowing the phrase in your mind, the password letters are random and uncorrelated, so unless the camera can tell which keys you hit exactly, it still won't be able to guess at the correct sequence by looking for matches to real words or dates.






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    6 Answers
    6






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    oldest

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    6 Answers
    6






    active

    oldest

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    active

    oldest

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    active

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    up vote
    170
    down vote



    accepted










    Lots of examples. A high-profile and recent example is when Kanye was caught on camera entering his "00000" password to unlock his device.



    Shoulder-surfing is one reason why applications do not display the password text on the screen, but show ****** instead.



    And this is one reason why multi-factor authentication is so important; even if you know the password, you cannot use it without another factor.



    I have even seen viable research into capturing the sound of the keyboard when a user types the password, even over the computer's microphone.



    So, yes, you describe a viable risk that the industry has been addressing for a long time. The specifics of high-res cameras is just not a significant enough of a new factor to consider. Shoulder-surfing and keyloggers are a current risk.



    The industry knows that it needs to develop something better than passwords, and there are many active attempts to do so, but nothing is mature or stable enough yet.






    share|improve this answer



















    • 65




      I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 15:58






    • 11




      I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
      – davnicwil
      Nov 8 at 16:10






    • 4




      @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 16:38






    • 10




      @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
      – Doktor J
      Nov 8 at 20:30






    • 5




      @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 21:27















    up vote
    170
    down vote



    accepted










    Lots of examples. A high-profile and recent example is when Kanye was caught on camera entering his "00000" password to unlock his device.



    Shoulder-surfing is one reason why applications do not display the password text on the screen, but show ****** instead.



    And this is one reason why multi-factor authentication is so important; even if you know the password, you cannot use it without another factor.



    I have even seen viable research into capturing the sound of the keyboard when a user types the password, even over the computer's microphone.



    So, yes, you describe a viable risk that the industry has been addressing for a long time. The specifics of high-res cameras is just not a significant enough of a new factor to consider. Shoulder-surfing and keyloggers are a current risk.



    The industry knows that it needs to develop something better than passwords, and there are many active attempts to do so, but nothing is mature or stable enough yet.






    share|improve this answer



















    • 65




      I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 15:58






    • 11




      I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
      – davnicwil
      Nov 8 at 16:10






    • 4




      @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 16:38






    • 10




      @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
      – Doktor J
      Nov 8 at 20:30






    • 5




      @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 21:27













    up vote
    170
    down vote



    accepted







    up vote
    170
    down vote



    accepted






    Lots of examples. A high-profile and recent example is when Kanye was caught on camera entering his "00000" password to unlock his device.



    Shoulder-surfing is one reason why applications do not display the password text on the screen, but show ****** instead.



    And this is one reason why multi-factor authentication is so important; even if you know the password, you cannot use it without another factor.



    I have even seen viable research into capturing the sound of the keyboard when a user types the password, even over the computer's microphone.



    So, yes, you describe a viable risk that the industry has been addressing for a long time. The specifics of high-res cameras is just not a significant enough of a new factor to consider. Shoulder-surfing and keyloggers are a current risk.



    The industry knows that it needs to develop something better than passwords, and there are many active attempts to do so, but nothing is mature or stable enough yet.






    share|improve this answer














    Lots of examples. A high-profile and recent example is when Kanye was caught on camera entering his "00000" password to unlock his device.



    Shoulder-surfing is one reason why applications do not display the password text on the screen, but show ****** instead.



    And this is one reason why multi-factor authentication is so important; even if you know the password, you cannot use it without another factor.



    I have even seen viable research into capturing the sound of the keyboard when a user types the password, even over the computer's microphone.



    So, yes, you describe a viable risk that the industry has been addressing for a long time. The specifics of high-res cameras is just not a significant enough of a new factor to consider. Shoulder-surfing and keyloggers are a current risk.



    The industry knows that it needs to develop something better than passwords, and there are many active attempts to do so, but nothing is mature or stable enough yet.







    share|improve this answer














    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer








    edited Nov 12 at 19:49









    Mr. C

    1033




    1033










    answered Nov 8 at 15:46









    schroeder

    70.3k27152188




    70.3k27152188








    • 65




      I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 15:58






    • 11




      I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
      – davnicwil
      Nov 8 at 16:10






    • 4




      @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 16:38






    • 10




      @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
      – Doktor J
      Nov 8 at 20:30






    • 5




      @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 21:27














    • 65




      I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 15:58






    • 11




      I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
      – davnicwil
      Nov 8 at 16:10






    • 4




      @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 16:38






    • 10




      @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
      – Doktor J
      Nov 8 at 20:30






    • 5




      @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
      – schroeder
      Nov 8 at 21:27








    65




    65




    I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 15:58




    I would also add that there has been a case where a high-res photo was taken of a finger and used to create a replica fingerprint and used to open the biometrics of a phone. So, yes, cameras are a threat.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 15:58




    11




    11




    I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
    – davnicwil
    Nov 8 at 16:10




    I think the new factor with cameras is the potential for scale through both wider passive capture and automation
    – davnicwil
    Nov 8 at 16:10




    4




    4




    @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 16:38




    @davnicwil yep, that's a good point too. When designing the camera placement in an office building, we had to perform a number of calculations on the risks of capturing people typing. What I'm saying is that the problem space is far from new.
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 16:38




    10




    10




    @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
    – Doktor J
    Nov 8 at 20:30




    @Bakuriu I might humbly suggest that not everyone lives in Italy. Especially in cases where a company has sensitive info to protect, or high-value goods, further video surveillance may be warranted to minimize liability and risk.
    – Doktor J
    Nov 8 at 20:30




    5




    5




    @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 21:27




    @bakuriu the answer is simply that there was a business need and there were no barriers to doing it the way we did
    – schroeder
    Nov 8 at 21:27












    up vote
    54
    down vote













    As another example, here are some images from KrebsOnSecurity on ATM Skimmers (devices used to steal ATM credentials)





    Camera 1Hidden camera behind ATM faceplate (source)



    Camera 2Hidden camera glued to corner of ATM (source)



    Camera 3Hidden camera on fake panel of ATM (source)





    So yes, it is a very real-world concern.






    share|improve this answer





















    • I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
      – fortunate_man
      Nov 10 at 13:44






    • 7




      @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
      – Ross Ridge
      Nov 10 at 16:28






    • 1




      I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
      – Wildcard
      Nov 12 at 18:39















    up vote
    54
    down vote













    As another example, here are some images from KrebsOnSecurity on ATM Skimmers (devices used to steal ATM credentials)





    Camera 1Hidden camera behind ATM faceplate (source)



    Camera 2Hidden camera glued to corner of ATM (source)



    Camera 3Hidden camera on fake panel of ATM (source)





    So yes, it is a very real-world concern.






    share|improve this answer





















    • I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
      – fortunate_man
      Nov 10 at 13:44






    • 7




      @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
      – Ross Ridge
      Nov 10 at 16:28






    • 1




      I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
      – Wildcard
      Nov 12 at 18:39













    up vote
    54
    down vote










    up vote
    54
    down vote









    As another example, here are some images from KrebsOnSecurity on ATM Skimmers (devices used to steal ATM credentials)





    Camera 1Hidden camera behind ATM faceplate (source)



    Camera 2Hidden camera glued to corner of ATM (source)



    Camera 3Hidden camera on fake panel of ATM (source)





    So yes, it is a very real-world concern.






    share|improve this answer












    As another example, here are some images from KrebsOnSecurity on ATM Skimmers (devices used to steal ATM credentials)





    Camera 1Hidden camera behind ATM faceplate (source)



    Camera 2Hidden camera glued to corner of ATM (source)



    Camera 3Hidden camera on fake panel of ATM (source)





    So yes, it is a very real-world concern.







    share|improve this answer












    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer










    answered Nov 8 at 23:07









    BlueRaja - Danny Pflughoeft

    1,8371118




    1,8371118












    • I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
      – fortunate_man
      Nov 10 at 13:44






    • 7




      @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
      – Ross Ridge
      Nov 10 at 16:28






    • 1




      I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
      – Wildcard
      Nov 12 at 18:39


















    • I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
      – fortunate_man
      Nov 10 at 13:44






    • 7




      @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
      – Ross Ridge
      Nov 10 at 16:28






    • 1




      I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
      – Wildcard
      Nov 12 at 18:39
















    I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
    – fortunate_man
    Nov 10 at 13:44




    I'd like to point out that the two ATM images are different in other ways too. For example, the card slot on the right in the ATM machine seems to have changed between the two images. There seems to be some sort of protruding card slot in the second image. What is this?
    – fortunate_man
    Nov 10 at 13:44




    7




    7




    @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
    – Ross Ridge
    Nov 10 at 16:28




    @fortunate_man It's the actual skimmer that records the data on the magnetic stripe on the card. It's what you actually want to be looking for when using an ATM, since your PIN is useless without it, but the reverse isn't necessarily true.
    – Ross Ridge
    Nov 10 at 16:28




    1




    1




    I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
    – Wildcard
    Nov 12 at 18:39




    I'm surprised you didn't include krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/…, which much more directly answers the question.
    – Wildcard
    Nov 12 at 18:39










    up vote
    15
    down vote













    Also, there have been cases reported where thermal imagers were used to extract a PIN or password from a keyboard just used to enter it - the hotter a key, if time of finger contact is about equal (heat soaks in...), the more recently it has been pressed. This might not present the password on a silver platter due to duplicate keys, different finger dwell times, but can extremely narrow the possible passwords.






    share|improve this answer

















    • 25




      My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 11:02






    • 2




      @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
      – Ivan Kolmychek
      Nov 9 at 19:24








    • 2




      Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 19:46






    • 2




      @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
      – rackandboneman
      Nov 9 at 21:22






    • 4




      I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
      – Hagen von Eitzen
      Nov 10 at 10:15















    up vote
    15
    down vote













    Also, there have been cases reported where thermal imagers were used to extract a PIN or password from a keyboard just used to enter it - the hotter a key, if time of finger contact is about equal (heat soaks in...), the more recently it has been pressed. This might not present the password on a silver platter due to duplicate keys, different finger dwell times, but can extremely narrow the possible passwords.






    share|improve this answer

















    • 25




      My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 11:02






    • 2




      @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
      – Ivan Kolmychek
      Nov 9 at 19:24








    • 2




      Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 19:46






    • 2




      @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
      – rackandboneman
      Nov 9 at 21:22






    • 4




      I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
      – Hagen von Eitzen
      Nov 10 at 10:15













    up vote
    15
    down vote










    up vote
    15
    down vote









    Also, there have been cases reported where thermal imagers were used to extract a PIN or password from a keyboard just used to enter it - the hotter a key, if time of finger contact is about equal (heat soaks in...), the more recently it has been pressed. This might not present the password on a silver platter due to duplicate keys, different finger dwell times, but can extremely narrow the possible passwords.






    share|improve this answer












    Also, there have been cases reported where thermal imagers were used to extract a PIN or password from a keyboard just used to enter it - the hotter a key, if time of finger contact is about equal (heat soaks in...), the more recently it has been pressed. This might not present the password on a silver platter due to duplicate keys, different finger dwell times, but can extremely narrow the possible passwords.







    share|improve this answer












    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer










    answered Nov 8 at 22:05









    rackandboneman

    70137




    70137








    • 25




      My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 11:02






    • 2




      @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
      – Ivan Kolmychek
      Nov 9 at 19:24








    • 2




      Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 19:46






    • 2




      @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
      – rackandboneman
      Nov 9 at 21:22






    • 4




      I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
      – Hagen von Eitzen
      Nov 10 at 10:15














    • 25




      My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 11:02






    • 2




      @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
      – Ivan Kolmychek
      Nov 9 at 19:24








    • 2




      Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
      – Lenne
      Nov 9 at 19:46






    • 2




      @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
      – rackandboneman
      Nov 9 at 21:22






    • 4




      I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
      – Hagen von Eitzen
      Nov 10 at 10:15








    25




    25




    My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 11:02




    My relatively cheap chinese door lock have a (I don't know if this is intentionaly or it just happened) way off deterring shoulder-surfers: Only the first and the last n digits matters. So, if the code is 1234, if you are suspicious somebody is watching, you could enter 124579413245430234, and most snoopers would have lost track of your keys by then. All keys would have the same temperature and greasiness also.
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 11:02




    2




    2




    @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
    – Ivan Kolmychek
    Nov 9 at 19:24






    @Lenne but if someone can (secretly?) record you two or more times, instead of just shoulder-surfing, can't they figure out actual code by comparing few inputs? :)
    – Ivan Kolmychek
    Nov 9 at 19:24






    2




    2




    Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 19:46




    Sure, but even if something isn't 100% protection, everything which makes it harder will stop some, and delay the rest
    – Lenne
    Nov 9 at 19:46




    2




    2




    @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
    – rackandboneman
    Nov 9 at 21:22




    @Lenne that lock could be much improved by not accepting an EXACT entered number combination for several attempts....
    – rackandboneman
    Nov 9 at 21:22




    4




    4




    I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
    – Hagen von Eitzen
    Nov 10 at 10:15




    I think, smear traces on smart phone screens also fall in this category
    – Hagen von Eitzen
    Nov 10 at 10:15










    up vote
    11
    down vote













    Something that may help: Get into the habbit of "pressing" a few buttons in addition to your password.



    Say, your password is 1234. You could hit the 1 and 2, pretend to press, say, 9, and then continue your password.



    It discourages any cameras, key-wear down, or onlookers. It's certainly low grade, yes, but it deters people who have 1000 other clips of footage to go through.






    share|improve this answer








    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.


















    • I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
      – ouflak
      2 days ago















    up vote
    11
    down vote













    Something that may help: Get into the habbit of "pressing" a few buttons in addition to your password.



    Say, your password is 1234. You could hit the 1 and 2, pretend to press, say, 9, and then continue your password.



    It discourages any cameras, key-wear down, or onlookers. It's certainly low grade, yes, but it deters people who have 1000 other clips of footage to go through.






    share|improve this answer








    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.


















    • I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
      – ouflak
      2 days ago













    up vote
    11
    down vote










    up vote
    11
    down vote









    Something that may help: Get into the habbit of "pressing" a few buttons in addition to your password.



    Say, your password is 1234. You could hit the 1 and 2, pretend to press, say, 9, and then continue your password.



    It discourages any cameras, key-wear down, or onlookers. It's certainly low grade, yes, but it deters people who have 1000 other clips of footage to go through.






    share|improve this answer








    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.









    Something that may help: Get into the habbit of "pressing" a few buttons in addition to your password.



    Say, your password is 1234. You could hit the 1 and 2, pretend to press, say, 9, and then continue your password.



    It discourages any cameras, key-wear down, or onlookers. It's certainly low grade, yes, but it deters people who have 1000 other clips of footage to go through.







    share|improve this answer








    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.









    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer






    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.









    answered Nov 13 at 1:26









    Kyle

    1112




    1112




    New contributor




    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.





    New contributor





    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.






    Kyle is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
    Check out our Code of Conduct.












    • I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
      – ouflak
      2 days ago


















    • I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
      – ouflak
      2 days ago
















    I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
    – ouflak
    2 days ago




    I do this often. Being a touch typist helps. Just put your fingers in position, and press the actual pin numbers amongst the faux key presses as you wish. The only key press that stands out is pressing the enter key.
    – ouflak
    2 days ago










    up vote
    8
    down vote













    Yes, and this is one of many reasons that you should not be entering passwords, and for the most part should not even know your passwords, except for a password manager master password and device unlock codes/FDE passphrases. For FDE passphrases, you should enter them only when powering on the device, and only in private locations where there are no cameras or observers present.






    share|improve this answer





















    • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
      – Rory Alsop
      Nov 10 at 19:59















    up vote
    8
    down vote













    Yes, and this is one of many reasons that you should not be entering passwords, and for the most part should not even know your passwords, except for a password manager master password and device unlock codes/FDE passphrases. For FDE passphrases, you should enter them only when powering on the device, and only in private locations where there are no cameras or observers present.






    share|improve this answer





















    • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
      – Rory Alsop
      Nov 10 at 19:59













    up vote
    8
    down vote










    up vote
    8
    down vote









    Yes, and this is one of many reasons that you should not be entering passwords, and for the most part should not even know your passwords, except for a password manager master password and device unlock codes/FDE passphrases. For FDE passphrases, you should enter them only when powering on the device, and only in private locations where there are no cameras or observers present.






    share|improve this answer












    Yes, and this is one of many reasons that you should not be entering passwords, and for the most part should not even know your passwords, except for a password manager master password and device unlock codes/FDE passphrases. For FDE passphrases, you should enter them only when powering on the device, and only in private locations where there are no cameras or observers present.







    share|improve this answer












    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer










    answered Nov 9 at 1:48









    R..

    3,97711317




    3,97711317












    • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
      – Rory Alsop
      Nov 10 at 19:59


















    • Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
      – Rory Alsop
      Nov 10 at 19:59
















    Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
    – Rory Alsop
    Nov 10 at 19:59




    Comments are not for extended discussion; this conversation has been moved to chat.
    – Rory Alsop
    Nov 10 at 19:59










    up vote
    8
    down vote













    I would say yes, and high resolution imagery is not necessary. Speaking as a statistician, I don't even need to know the exact letter or numeral you touched (on a screen keyboard or regular keyboard), reducing each choice to 2 or 3 possible characters, based on the position of your fingers, makes an electronic guess of your password a tractable problem. Especially I would try likely combinations of letters that form word fragments; e.g. ([FR][EW][DE])="FEE", "FED", or "RED".



    Or if numbers, I'd look for combinations that appear in numbers related to you: birthdays, anniversaries, for you, spouse, kids. Your phone number or house address.



    On a screen or a real keyboard, I can see when you shift for special characters and guess what they are. And sometimes it is clear which key you hit, depending on the angle of the camera, narrowing some position to exactly one key. The camera can narrow the field of possible passwords considerably, and often in analysis that scores how well passwords match words and dates, the "right" password can be at the top of the scoring list.



    For this reason, acronymic phrases can help defeat this. The idea is to memorize a phrase that means something to you, like "If the Seahawks win the championship I'll get drunk and dance a jig." Then make an Acronym: "ITSWTCIGDADAJ". You can teach yourself to replace some of these letters with numerals or special characters.



    Without knowing the phrase in your mind, the password letters are random and uncorrelated, so unless the camera can tell which keys you hit exactly, it still won't be able to guess at the correct sequence by looking for matches to real words or dates.






    share|improve this answer

























      up vote
      8
      down vote













      I would say yes, and high resolution imagery is not necessary. Speaking as a statistician, I don't even need to know the exact letter or numeral you touched (on a screen keyboard or regular keyboard), reducing each choice to 2 or 3 possible characters, based on the position of your fingers, makes an electronic guess of your password a tractable problem. Especially I would try likely combinations of letters that form word fragments; e.g. ([FR][EW][DE])="FEE", "FED", or "RED".



      Or if numbers, I'd look for combinations that appear in numbers related to you: birthdays, anniversaries, for you, spouse, kids. Your phone number or house address.



      On a screen or a real keyboard, I can see when you shift for special characters and guess what they are. And sometimes it is clear which key you hit, depending on the angle of the camera, narrowing some position to exactly one key. The camera can narrow the field of possible passwords considerably, and often in analysis that scores how well passwords match words and dates, the "right" password can be at the top of the scoring list.



      For this reason, acronymic phrases can help defeat this. The idea is to memorize a phrase that means something to you, like "If the Seahawks win the championship I'll get drunk and dance a jig." Then make an Acronym: "ITSWTCIGDADAJ". You can teach yourself to replace some of these letters with numerals or special characters.



      Without knowing the phrase in your mind, the password letters are random and uncorrelated, so unless the camera can tell which keys you hit exactly, it still won't be able to guess at the correct sequence by looking for matches to real words or dates.






      share|improve this answer























        up vote
        8
        down vote










        up vote
        8
        down vote









        I would say yes, and high resolution imagery is not necessary. Speaking as a statistician, I don't even need to know the exact letter or numeral you touched (on a screen keyboard or regular keyboard), reducing each choice to 2 or 3 possible characters, based on the position of your fingers, makes an electronic guess of your password a tractable problem. Especially I would try likely combinations of letters that form word fragments; e.g. ([FR][EW][DE])="FEE", "FED", or "RED".



        Or if numbers, I'd look for combinations that appear in numbers related to you: birthdays, anniversaries, for you, spouse, kids. Your phone number or house address.



        On a screen or a real keyboard, I can see when you shift for special characters and guess what they are. And sometimes it is clear which key you hit, depending on the angle of the camera, narrowing some position to exactly one key. The camera can narrow the field of possible passwords considerably, and often in analysis that scores how well passwords match words and dates, the "right" password can be at the top of the scoring list.



        For this reason, acronymic phrases can help defeat this. The idea is to memorize a phrase that means something to you, like "If the Seahawks win the championship I'll get drunk and dance a jig." Then make an Acronym: "ITSWTCIGDADAJ". You can teach yourself to replace some of these letters with numerals or special characters.



        Without knowing the phrase in your mind, the password letters are random and uncorrelated, so unless the camera can tell which keys you hit exactly, it still won't be able to guess at the correct sequence by looking for matches to real words or dates.






        share|improve this answer












        I would say yes, and high resolution imagery is not necessary. Speaking as a statistician, I don't even need to know the exact letter or numeral you touched (on a screen keyboard or regular keyboard), reducing each choice to 2 or 3 possible characters, based on the position of your fingers, makes an electronic guess of your password a tractable problem. Especially I would try likely combinations of letters that form word fragments; e.g. ([FR][EW][DE])="FEE", "FED", or "RED".



        Or if numbers, I'd look for combinations that appear in numbers related to you: birthdays, anniversaries, for you, spouse, kids. Your phone number or house address.



        On a screen or a real keyboard, I can see when you shift for special characters and guess what they are. And sometimes it is clear which key you hit, depending on the angle of the camera, narrowing some position to exactly one key. The camera can narrow the field of possible passwords considerably, and often in analysis that scores how well passwords match words and dates, the "right" password can be at the top of the scoring list.



        For this reason, acronymic phrases can help defeat this. The idea is to memorize a phrase that means something to you, like "If the Seahawks win the championship I'll get drunk and dance a jig." Then make an Acronym: "ITSWTCIGDADAJ". You can teach yourself to replace some of these letters with numerals or special characters.



        Without knowing the phrase in your mind, the password letters are random and uncorrelated, so unless the camera can tell which keys you hit exactly, it still won't be able to guess at the correct sequence by looking for matches to real words or dates.







        share|improve this answer












        share|improve this answer



        share|improve this answer










        answered Nov 9 at 23:24









        Amadeus

        1811




        1811

















            protected by Jeff Ferland Nov 13 at 18:09



            Thank you for your interest in this question.
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