Secure way to login to a website on someone else's computer
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Suppose I am in a situation that I am forced to login to my account using someone else's computer. Is there any secure way to do that so that I would be sure that my login details (i.e. password) is not recorded by any means (e.g. keystroke logging)? Or if it is impossible, what are the ways to at least mitigate the risks?
Although related, but note that this is a bit different from this question since I am not using my own computer to login.
authentication
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up vote
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Suppose I am in a situation that I am forced to login to my account using someone else's computer. Is there any secure way to do that so that I would be sure that my login details (i.e. password) is not recorded by any means (e.g. keystroke logging)? Or if it is impossible, what are the ways to at least mitigate the risks?
Although related, but note that this is a bit different from this question since I am not using my own computer to login.
authentication
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8
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
4
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
4
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
25
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
2
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago
|
show 3 more comments
up vote
58
down vote
favorite
up vote
58
down vote
favorite
Suppose I am in a situation that I am forced to login to my account using someone else's computer. Is there any secure way to do that so that I would be sure that my login details (i.e. password) is not recorded by any means (e.g. keystroke logging)? Or if it is impossible, what are the ways to at least mitigate the risks?
Although related, but note that this is a bit different from this question since I am not using my own computer to login.
authentication
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today is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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Suppose I am in a situation that I am forced to login to my account using someone else's computer. Is there any secure way to do that so that I would be sure that my login details (i.e. password) is not recorded by any means (e.g. keystroke logging)? Or if it is impossible, what are the ways to at least mitigate the risks?
Although related, but note that this is a bit different from this question since I am not using my own computer to login.
authentication
authentication
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asked 2 days ago
today
39435
39435
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today is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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8
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
4
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
4
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
25
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
2
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago
|
show 3 more comments
8
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
4
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
4
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
25
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
2
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago
8
8
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
4
4
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
4
4
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
25
25
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
2
2
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago
|
show 3 more comments
10 Answers
10
active
oldest
votes
up vote
72
down vote
This is an interesting question!
The rule of thumb is that if someone else has control of the device (and they're determined enough), they will always be able to monitor and modify all of your actions on the device.
We can (to a somewhat limited extent) get around this though! 2 factor authentication (such as Google's 2 Step Verification) can be used to ensure that even if someone has your password, they cannot get into your account without also having access to a seperate device (owned and controlled by you).
Keep in mind that once you log in, the computer ultimately has control over your interaction with the website, and as a result it could trivially see everything you do on the site and, less trivially, modify your requests to the site (including not logging you out properly when you're done, and potentially changing your login details to lock you out of your own account).
This all depends on how worried you are about being attacked - if you're just logging into Facebook on a friends computer, you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out. If you're entering missile launch codes however, you may want to stick to devices you control.
Edit: Additionally, consider the following, via user TemporalWolf
Some websites allow for the generation of single use one time passwords which side steps any sort of password logging... as you mentioned, this doesn't stop them from mucking with the now authenticated session.
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
|
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up vote
18
down vote
In my practice, when I need extra security, I usually change the password on my phone (or another trusted device), then log in on the untrusted computer and after everything is done, change my password back (if possible).
This relies on the fact that changing password logs you out everywhere, for most websites. It's rather practical.
Alternatively, some websites offer a "session control" where you can force detach / terminate sessions if you want.
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
17
down vote
Use SQRL
If a website supports SQRL (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm) then you have the option of having it display a QR code in the computer's browser that you let the SQRL app in your cell phone read, and thereby negotiate the authentication out of band.
SQRL is not yet widely adopted, but this precise use case was designed in from the beginning. (The other main use case is a SQRL app on your computer working in concert with the browser). In neither case is a password transmitted; SQRL uses Elliptic Curve public/private key technology to sign a nonce presented by the server to prove the user has the private key associated with the public key stored on the server in the user's account info.
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
|
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up vote
10
down vote
If you encounter this situation regularly, try the following:
Create a Tails live USB stick. Tails is a Linux operating system designed to run off a USB, which can be booted on most computers. Using Tails means that you don't need to worry about any software that the hostile computer may have installed. Because you are completely bypassing it from boot.
Use the on-screen keyboard. You should cover this with your hand as you type, to prevent anyone from observing. This defends against hardware based key-loggers. Note that you don't need to worry about screen-recording software, because you are running Tails, which means that you have full control over all software running on the system.
Edit:
As @Xen2050 mentioned in the comments, you can also achieve this with other operating systems which may be more user friendly. For instance, here are instructions for creating a live Ubuntu Linux USB on Windows, Mac or Ubuntu. And here are the instructions for accessing the on-screen keyboard on Ubuntu.
Potential weaknesses of this method:
This method is vulnerable to the following:
- Hardware based screen recording. It is possible to insert a device between the computer and the screen which will record everything sent to the screen. For example, this one. To protect against this, inspect the cable, and make sure there are no devices between the computer and the screen. Note however, that it is possible to install internal screen recording devices which would be much more difficult to detect. If you suspect this, then you may be able to circumvent them by unplugging the screen from the back of the computer, and reconnecting it to a different port.
- Malicious firmware, BIOS, rootkit, etc. This is probably the most difficult vulnerability to defend against. If you suspect that the computer you are using has malicious firmware, don't use it! Find another way to login to the website, or don't login to it.
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2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
UnderHardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.
– Private
11 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
5
down vote
It is a major PIA, but relatively secure with respect to protecting your password. Mostly because it is such a PIA that nobody is likely to put together what is needed to capture it. Which means the caveat about security through obscurity likely applies here...
- Open text editor of choice.
- Type out the full alphabet in both upper and lower case.
- type out the full range of numbers and symbols that are available.
- Copy and paste letter by letter to enter your password on the web form.
- As an added layer of obfuscation, don't grab the letters in the same order as the final password
I can think of a few techniques where I might be able to capture the password of someone using this technique, but none of them are what I would consider easy or straightforward.
Also worth noting that this technique was originally suggested as a counter measure by my CEH instructor. It is not perfect, but it is a semi-decent option that doesn't require much in the way of prior preparation.
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14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
|
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up vote
5
down vote
There is one thing you can do on sites that allow it (Google being one): Use a "have" factor of authentication, such as TOTP or a mobile app to approve logins. You don't have to use 2FA - that can be your only factor. I have some of my non-critical servers set to allow password OR totp, so I can log in with one or the other, without needing both. While, as others pointed out, that doesn't make you completely secure (after you log in the attacker could disable input and do whatever they want now that you're logged in), it prevents disclosing any passwords.
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
The best way to protect yourself is to tell the person that you are not comfortable entering your password at their computer.
If you have probable cause or general paranoia then do not perform unsafe actions.
Expecting to thoroughly detect and/or mitigate all threat models in a matter of seconds is ludicrous.
What is the threat model anyways? Do you not trust the person? Do you not trust the computer? Are you trying to prevent their access from the particular website which you are logging in to? Are you trying to prevent the discovery of your password because you use it for a hundred other services such as personal banking? Are you simply trying to figure out a universal way to not be compromised regardless of which foreign computer you encounter in the future? Are you trying to prevent the details of the post-login screen from being recorded? You may wish to sweep the area for any hidden video recording devices in the ceiling.
add a comment |
up vote
1
down vote
If you need to login using someone else's computer, there is no certain way to know for certain if there is any form of spying software. Even if it is someone you trust, they could be infected with a virus or a similar nefarious device, and it can be hard to impossible to know if it is infected. Always assume that a nefarious entity will still be able to view/access anything that happens on the computer. Here are a few ways you can try to mitigate the risks.
There is no possible way to ensure that the person's OS is not compromised. You can look at the running processes, examine call stacks, network requests or anything, but spyware programs can be extremely well disguised. The best possible solution is to boot from a live USB stick using a linux distribution such as Ubuntu, puppy linux or Kali linux. This means that you should have full control of the software running on the computer, although a determined hacker could insert malicious code into the BIOS or bootloader of the computer, changing the actual code of the operating system.
Mitigation of Hardware based vulnerabilities
- Check the cable between the computer and the display. A device can be inserted in between them allowing a hacker to see the display output.
- Avoid using a wireless keyboard or mouse. The signal can be intercepted between the transmitter and receiver, exposing keystrokes and mouse movements, even via a separate device.
- Plug any USB devices directly into the motherboard. Don't use a PCIe slot, as the device could be storing/transmitting keystrokes/commands. The same applies to front panel connectors.
- Use a different keyboard, if possible. Devices can take the sounds of individual keys being pressed to decipher which key it was. Unplug any microphones connected to the computer, just in case.
- Look to see if there are any extra PCIe or serial port devices plugged in. Ensure only the required ones are plugged in, just in case.
Software methods of decreasing the risk
- Ensure you connect to a secured WiFi network, or ethernet, if you know it is safe. It is probably better to use mobile data, and a mobile hotspot, if possible, so you don't have to rely on their internet connection. Use a USB cable as well, if possible, so you don't run the risk of an alternative WiFi connection intercepting the signal instead.
- Use SSL. This is obvious, but you must ensure the certificate authority is the one that you would expect to see, as it is possible for an entity to insert a self-signed certificate into the chain.
The last thing is that you should, if possible, temporarily change your password (maybe using your phone) while you login using that computer, then change it back afterwards, so if the password is compromised, it will not be usable after it is changed back.
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up vote
0
down vote
When you suspect the system is keylogged you would need to be able to interrupt that process to do what you are asking.
That might be a visible process though - so if it's mission critical try finding that process or creating another user account with an encrypted terminal in a sandbox to see if you can avoid logging that way - i.e. Linux with encrypted home folder & swap as an example.
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
|
show 2 more comments
up vote
-9
down vote
Just open that website or form in an Incognito window of chrome. Press Ctrl+shift+N to open and if the dialogue appears to save password click No. Simple as that.
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7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
add a comment |
10 Answers
10
active
oldest
votes
10 Answers
10
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
72
down vote
This is an interesting question!
The rule of thumb is that if someone else has control of the device (and they're determined enough), they will always be able to monitor and modify all of your actions on the device.
We can (to a somewhat limited extent) get around this though! 2 factor authentication (such as Google's 2 Step Verification) can be used to ensure that even if someone has your password, they cannot get into your account without also having access to a seperate device (owned and controlled by you).
Keep in mind that once you log in, the computer ultimately has control over your interaction with the website, and as a result it could trivially see everything you do on the site and, less trivially, modify your requests to the site (including not logging you out properly when you're done, and potentially changing your login details to lock you out of your own account).
This all depends on how worried you are about being attacked - if you're just logging into Facebook on a friends computer, you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out. If you're entering missile launch codes however, you may want to stick to devices you control.
Edit: Additionally, consider the following, via user TemporalWolf
Some websites allow for the generation of single use one time passwords which side steps any sort of password logging... as you mentioned, this doesn't stop them from mucking with the now authenticated session.
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
|
show 3 more comments
up vote
72
down vote
This is an interesting question!
The rule of thumb is that if someone else has control of the device (and they're determined enough), they will always be able to monitor and modify all of your actions on the device.
We can (to a somewhat limited extent) get around this though! 2 factor authentication (such as Google's 2 Step Verification) can be used to ensure that even if someone has your password, they cannot get into your account without also having access to a seperate device (owned and controlled by you).
Keep in mind that once you log in, the computer ultimately has control over your interaction with the website, and as a result it could trivially see everything you do on the site and, less trivially, modify your requests to the site (including not logging you out properly when you're done, and potentially changing your login details to lock you out of your own account).
This all depends on how worried you are about being attacked - if you're just logging into Facebook on a friends computer, you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out. If you're entering missile launch codes however, you may want to stick to devices you control.
Edit: Additionally, consider the following, via user TemporalWolf
Some websites allow for the generation of single use one time passwords which side steps any sort of password logging... as you mentioned, this doesn't stop them from mucking with the now authenticated session.
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
|
show 3 more comments
up vote
72
down vote
up vote
72
down vote
This is an interesting question!
The rule of thumb is that if someone else has control of the device (and they're determined enough), they will always be able to monitor and modify all of your actions on the device.
We can (to a somewhat limited extent) get around this though! 2 factor authentication (such as Google's 2 Step Verification) can be used to ensure that even if someone has your password, they cannot get into your account without also having access to a seperate device (owned and controlled by you).
Keep in mind that once you log in, the computer ultimately has control over your interaction with the website, and as a result it could trivially see everything you do on the site and, less trivially, modify your requests to the site (including not logging you out properly when you're done, and potentially changing your login details to lock you out of your own account).
This all depends on how worried you are about being attacked - if you're just logging into Facebook on a friends computer, you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out. If you're entering missile launch codes however, you may want to stick to devices you control.
Edit: Additionally, consider the following, via user TemporalWolf
Some websites allow for the generation of single use one time passwords which side steps any sort of password logging... as you mentioned, this doesn't stop them from mucking with the now authenticated session.
This is an interesting question!
The rule of thumb is that if someone else has control of the device (and they're determined enough), they will always be able to monitor and modify all of your actions on the device.
We can (to a somewhat limited extent) get around this though! 2 factor authentication (such as Google's 2 Step Verification) can be used to ensure that even if someone has your password, they cannot get into your account without also having access to a seperate device (owned and controlled by you).
Keep in mind that once you log in, the computer ultimately has control over your interaction with the website, and as a result it could trivially see everything you do on the site and, less trivially, modify your requests to the site (including not logging you out properly when you're done, and potentially changing your login details to lock you out of your own account).
This all depends on how worried you are about being attacked - if you're just logging into Facebook on a friends computer, you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out. If you're entering missile launch codes however, you may want to stick to devices you control.
Edit: Additionally, consider the following, via user TemporalWolf
Some websites allow for the generation of single use one time passwords which side steps any sort of password logging... as you mentioned, this doesn't stop them from mucking with the now authenticated session.
edited yesterday
NotThatGuy
1053
1053
answered 2 days ago
Cowthulhu
692217
692217
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
|
show 3 more comments
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
1
1
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
"you can probably trust that when you hit "Log Out", it actually logs you out." Unless your friend unknowingly has malware on their computer.
– Qwertie
yesterday
7
7
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
Since this is saying that someone else having control of a device ensures they will always be able to monitor actions that take place on it, it is the only correct answer.
– forest
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
@NotThatGuy I think if you submit an edit request?
– Cowthulhu
yesterday
2
2
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
The issue with 2FA is that if indeed the attacker did have a keylogger and indeed modified the requests to the website(s) to essentially block a logout, they would then be able to change your account password/2FA settings having keylogged your password when you logged in. I don't know of any services that require 2FA to change the password once already authenticated. So that's an interesting dilemma.
– Chris Cirefice
yesterday
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
This is a good answer. I would add that if the OP is worried he should monitor his account afterward using a device he controls, e.g. when you're on Facebook you can see a list of devices that are logged on, and you can even force them all to logout/reauthenticate. (Not sure if the SAC missile launch control web site has the same feature.)
– John Wu
23 hours ago
|
show 3 more comments
up vote
18
down vote
In my practice, when I need extra security, I usually change the password on my phone (or another trusted device), then log in on the untrusted computer and after everything is done, change my password back (if possible).
This relies on the fact that changing password logs you out everywhere, for most websites. It's rather practical.
Alternatively, some websites offer a "session control" where you can force detach / terminate sessions if you want.
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
18
down vote
In my practice, when I need extra security, I usually change the password on my phone (or another trusted device), then log in on the untrusted computer and after everything is done, change my password back (if possible).
This relies on the fact that changing password logs you out everywhere, for most websites. It's rather practical.
Alternatively, some websites offer a "session control" where you can force detach / terminate sessions if you want.
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
18
down vote
up vote
18
down vote
In my practice, when I need extra security, I usually change the password on my phone (or another trusted device), then log in on the untrusted computer and after everything is done, change my password back (if possible).
This relies on the fact that changing password logs you out everywhere, for most websites. It's rather practical.
Alternatively, some websites offer a "session control" where you can force detach / terminate sessions if you want.
In my practice, when I need extra security, I usually change the password on my phone (or another trusted device), then log in on the untrusted computer and after everything is done, change my password back (if possible).
This relies on the fact that changing password logs you out everywhere, for most websites. It's rather practical.
Alternatively, some websites offer a "session control" where you can force detach / terminate sessions if you want.
answered yesterday
iBug
3508
3508
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
add a comment |
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
That's a good idea, which doesn't require special knowledge nor tools, and keeps things secure enough.
– a25bedc5-3d09-41b8-82fb-ea6c353d75ae
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
17
down vote
Use SQRL
If a website supports SQRL (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm) then you have the option of having it display a QR code in the computer's browser that you let the SQRL app in your cell phone read, and thereby negotiate the authentication out of band.
SQRL is not yet widely adopted, but this precise use case was designed in from the beginning. (The other main use case is a SQRL app on your computer working in concert with the browser). In neither case is a password transmitted; SQRL uses Elliptic Curve public/private key technology to sign a nonce presented by the server to prove the user has the private key associated with the public key stored on the server in the user's account info.
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
|
show 13 more comments
up vote
17
down vote
Use SQRL
If a website supports SQRL (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm) then you have the option of having it display a QR code in the computer's browser that you let the SQRL app in your cell phone read, and thereby negotiate the authentication out of band.
SQRL is not yet widely adopted, but this precise use case was designed in from the beginning. (The other main use case is a SQRL app on your computer working in concert with the browser). In neither case is a password transmitted; SQRL uses Elliptic Curve public/private key technology to sign a nonce presented by the server to prove the user has the private key associated with the public key stored on the server in the user's account info.
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
|
show 13 more comments
up vote
17
down vote
up vote
17
down vote
Use SQRL
If a website supports SQRL (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm) then you have the option of having it display a QR code in the computer's browser that you let the SQRL app in your cell phone read, and thereby negotiate the authentication out of band.
SQRL is not yet widely adopted, but this precise use case was designed in from the beginning. (The other main use case is a SQRL app on your computer working in concert with the browser). In neither case is a password transmitted; SQRL uses Elliptic Curve public/private key technology to sign a nonce presented by the server to prove the user has the private key associated with the public key stored on the server in the user's account info.
Use SQRL
If a website supports SQRL (https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm) then you have the option of having it display a QR code in the computer's browser that you let the SQRL app in your cell phone read, and thereby negotiate the authentication out of band.
SQRL is not yet widely adopted, but this precise use case was designed in from the beginning. (The other main use case is a SQRL app on your computer working in concert with the browser). In neither case is a password transmitted; SQRL uses Elliptic Curve public/private key technology to sign a nonce presented by the server to prove the user has the private key associated with the public key stored on the server in the user's account info.
answered 2 days ago
Monty Harder
46036
46036
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
|
show 13 more comments
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
1
1
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
The concept is definitely interesting, although it may need some (more) peer review and usability testing in practice. Anyway, this solution is not practical today, and the author of the question seemed to ask mainly as a user and not as a developer. Try using this method with Google, Amazon or Facebook today.
– caw
yesterday
15
15
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
security.blogoverflow.com/2013/10/debunking-sqrl - A well designed solution such as U2F is probably better than what Steve Gibson (which is largely a crank) managed to sting together by himself.
– vidarlo
yesterday
1
1
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
@forest Whether or not that guy is a crank, at least one swiss bank uses something like it: ubs.com/microsites/digital/en/private/access-app.html. You have an app on your phone that reads the QR code and negotiates the authentication. The app has an additional PIN you need to enter whenever you do that.
– Graipher
yesterday
4
4
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
@Graipher banks are not known to always have the best password practices though.
– ratchet freak
yesterday
3
3
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
@schroeder Also need a citation here on the rather rude comments about SG.
– Dan
yesterday
|
show 13 more comments
up vote
10
down vote
If you encounter this situation regularly, try the following:
Create a Tails live USB stick. Tails is a Linux operating system designed to run off a USB, which can be booted on most computers. Using Tails means that you don't need to worry about any software that the hostile computer may have installed. Because you are completely bypassing it from boot.
Use the on-screen keyboard. You should cover this with your hand as you type, to prevent anyone from observing. This defends against hardware based key-loggers. Note that you don't need to worry about screen-recording software, because you are running Tails, which means that you have full control over all software running on the system.
Edit:
As @Xen2050 mentioned in the comments, you can also achieve this with other operating systems which may be more user friendly. For instance, here are instructions for creating a live Ubuntu Linux USB on Windows, Mac or Ubuntu. And here are the instructions for accessing the on-screen keyboard on Ubuntu.
Potential weaknesses of this method:
This method is vulnerable to the following:
- Hardware based screen recording. It is possible to insert a device between the computer and the screen which will record everything sent to the screen. For example, this one. To protect against this, inspect the cable, and make sure there are no devices between the computer and the screen. Note however, that it is possible to install internal screen recording devices which would be much more difficult to detect. If you suspect this, then you may be able to circumvent them by unplugging the screen from the back of the computer, and reconnecting it to a different port.
- Malicious firmware, BIOS, rootkit, etc. This is probably the most difficult vulnerability to defend against. If you suspect that the computer you are using has malicious firmware, don't use it! Find another way to login to the website, or don't login to it.
New contributor
daviewales is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
UnderHardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.
– Private
11 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
10
down vote
If you encounter this situation regularly, try the following:
Create a Tails live USB stick. Tails is a Linux operating system designed to run off a USB, which can be booted on most computers. Using Tails means that you don't need to worry about any software that the hostile computer may have installed. Because you are completely bypassing it from boot.
Use the on-screen keyboard. You should cover this with your hand as you type, to prevent anyone from observing. This defends against hardware based key-loggers. Note that you don't need to worry about screen-recording software, because you are running Tails, which means that you have full control over all software running on the system.
Edit:
As @Xen2050 mentioned in the comments, you can also achieve this with other operating systems which may be more user friendly. For instance, here are instructions for creating a live Ubuntu Linux USB on Windows, Mac or Ubuntu. And here are the instructions for accessing the on-screen keyboard on Ubuntu.
Potential weaknesses of this method:
This method is vulnerable to the following:
- Hardware based screen recording. It is possible to insert a device between the computer and the screen which will record everything sent to the screen. For example, this one. To protect against this, inspect the cable, and make sure there are no devices between the computer and the screen. Note however, that it is possible to install internal screen recording devices which would be much more difficult to detect. If you suspect this, then you may be able to circumvent them by unplugging the screen from the back of the computer, and reconnecting it to a different port.
- Malicious firmware, BIOS, rootkit, etc. This is probably the most difficult vulnerability to defend against. If you suspect that the computer you are using has malicious firmware, don't use it! Find another way to login to the website, or don't login to it.
New contributor
daviewales is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
UnderHardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.
– Private
11 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
10
down vote
up vote
10
down vote
If you encounter this situation regularly, try the following:
Create a Tails live USB stick. Tails is a Linux operating system designed to run off a USB, which can be booted on most computers. Using Tails means that you don't need to worry about any software that the hostile computer may have installed. Because you are completely bypassing it from boot.
Use the on-screen keyboard. You should cover this with your hand as you type, to prevent anyone from observing. This defends against hardware based key-loggers. Note that you don't need to worry about screen-recording software, because you are running Tails, which means that you have full control over all software running on the system.
Edit:
As @Xen2050 mentioned in the comments, you can also achieve this with other operating systems which may be more user friendly. For instance, here are instructions for creating a live Ubuntu Linux USB on Windows, Mac or Ubuntu. And here are the instructions for accessing the on-screen keyboard on Ubuntu.
Potential weaknesses of this method:
This method is vulnerable to the following:
- Hardware based screen recording. It is possible to insert a device between the computer and the screen which will record everything sent to the screen. For example, this one. To protect against this, inspect the cable, and make sure there are no devices between the computer and the screen. Note however, that it is possible to install internal screen recording devices which would be much more difficult to detect. If you suspect this, then you may be able to circumvent them by unplugging the screen from the back of the computer, and reconnecting it to a different port.
- Malicious firmware, BIOS, rootkit, etc. This is probably the most difficult vulnerability to defend against. If you suspect that the computer you are using has malicious firmware, don't use it! Find another way to login to the website, or don't login to it.
New contributor
daviewales is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
If you encounter this situation regularly, try the following:
Create a Tails live USB stick. Tails is a Linux operating system designed to run off a USB, which can be booted on most computers. Using Tails means that you don't need to worry about any software that the hostile computer may have installed. Because you are completely bypassing it from boot.
Use the on-screen keyboard. You should cover this with your hand as you type, to prevent anyone from observing. This defends against hardware based key-loggers. Note that you don't need to worry about screen-recording software, because you are running Tails, which means that you have full control over all software running on the system.
Edit:
As @Xen2050 mentioned in the comments, you can also achieve this with other operating systems which may be more user friendly. For instance, here are instructions for creating a live Ubuntu Linux USB on Windows, Mac or Ubuntu. And here are the instructions for accessing the on-screen keyboard on Ubuntu.
Potential weaknesses of this method:
This method is vulnerable to the following:
- Hardware based screen recording. It is possible to insert a device between the computer and the screen which will record everything sent to the screen. For example, this one. To protect against this, inspect the cable, and make sure there are no devices between the computer and the screen. Note however, that it is possible to install internal screen recording devices which would be much more difficult to detect. If you suspect this, then you may be able to circumvent them by unplugging the screen from the back of the computer, and reconnecting it to a different port.
- Malicious firmware, BIOS, rootkit, etc. This is probably the most difficult vulnerability to defend against. If you suspect that the computer you are using has malicious firmware, don't use it! Find another way to login to the website, or don't login to it.
New contributor
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edited 22 hours ago
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answered yesterday
daviewales
20217
20217
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daviewales is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
UnderHardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.
– Private
11 hours ago
add a comment |
2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
UnderHardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.
– Private
11 hours ago
2
2
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
For unknown hardware, and since you don't seem to need the network properties of TAILS, using a more friendly and bootable distro like Mint or Ubuntu or other beginner-friendly one might be a lot more successful; TAILS might not have nearly as much luck booting on "new" unknown devices
– Xen2050
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
@Xen2050 Windows To Go is also a good alternative!
– iBug
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
Good point @Xen2050
– daviewales
yesterday
Under
Hardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.– Private
11 hours ago
Under
Hardware based recording, you could actually mention a hardware based keystroke logger that may be embedded in keyboard itself. This seems more likely if the person who owns the computer is trying to steal the OP's passwords.– Private
11 hours ago
add a comment |
up vote
5
down vote
It is a major PIA, but relatively secure with respect to protecting your password. Mostly because it is such a PIA that nobody is likely to put together what is needed to capture it. Which means the caveat about security through obscurity likely applies here...
- Open text editor of choice.
- Type out the full alphabet in both upper and lower case.
- type out the full range of numbers and symbols that are available.
- Copy and paste letter by letter to enter your password on the web form.
- As an added layer of obfuscation, don't grab the letters in the same order as the final password
I can think of a few techniques where I might be able to capture the password of someone using this technique, but none of them are what I would consider easy or straightforward.
Also worth noting that this technique was originally suggested as a counter measure by my CEH instructor. It is not perfect, but it is a semi-decent option that doesn't require much in the way of prior preparation.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
|
show 4 more comments
up vote
5
down vote
It is a major PIA, but relatively secure with respect to protecting your password. Mostly because it is such a PIA that nobody is likely to put together what is needed to capture it. Which means the caveat about security through obscurity likely applies here...
- Open text editor of choice.
- Type out the full alphabet in both upper and lower case.
- type out the full range of numbers and symbols that are available.
- Copy and paste letter by letter to enter your password on the web form.
- As an added layer of obfuscation, don't grab the letters in the same order as the final password
I can think of a few techniques where I might be able to capture the password of someone using this technique, but none of them are what I would consider easy or straightforward.
Also worth noting that this technique was originally suggested as a counter measure by my CEH instructor. It is not perfect, but it is a semi-decent option that doesn't require much in the way of prior preparation.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
|
show 4 more comments
up vote
5
down vote
up vote
5
down vote
It is a major PIA, but relatively secure with respect to protecting your password. Mostly because it is such a PIA that nobody is likely to put together what is needed to capture it. Which means the caveat about security through obscurity likely applies here...
- Open text editor of choice.
- Type out the full alphabet in both upper and lower case.
- type out the full range of numbers and symbols that are available.
- Copy and paste letter by letter to enter your password on the web form.
- As an added layer of obfuscation, don't grab the letters in the same order as the final password
I can think of a few techniques where I might be able to capture the password of someone using this technique, but none of them are what I would consider easy or straightforward.
Also worth noting that this technique was originally suggested as a counter measure by my CEH instructor. It is not perfect, but it is a semi-decent option that doesn't require much in the way of prior preparation.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
It is a major PIA, but relatively secure with respect to protecting your password. Mostly because it is such a PIA that nobody is likely to put together what is needed to capture it. Which means the caveat about security through obscurity likely applies here...
- Open text editor of choice.
- Type out the full alphabet in both upper and lower case.
- type out the full range of numbers and symbols that are available.
- Copy and paste letter by letter to enter your password on the web form.
- As an added layer of obfuscation, don't grab the letters in the same order as the final password
I can think of a few techniques where I might be able to capture the password of someone using this technique, but none of them are what I would consider easy or straightforward.
Also worth noting that this technique was originally suggested as a counter measure by my CEH instructor. It is not perfect, but it is a semi-decent option that doesn't require much in the way of prior preparation.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
answered 2 days ago
Rozwel
1752
1752
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Rozwel is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
|
show 4 more comments
14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
14
14
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Surely an off-the-shelf screen recorder would counter this?
– Draconis
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
Interesting solution, especially that I see it was recommended by your CEH instructor! Actually, I was thinking about such a solution before you post this but then I thought maybe it is a bit weird! Of course, as @Draconis mentioned, an screen recorder might be able to counter this as well.
– today
2 days ago
3
3
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
@Draconis probably, hadn't considered that option but high chance it would work. I had my doubts when this was suggested by the instructor, but it is better than nothing, and does protect against most keystroke loggers. But if I were wanting to capture someone's login credentials for a web site I would use a browser extension or proxy to log the post data. Making all of this worthless...
– Rozwel
2 days ago
5
5
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
A clipboard logger would work very well up until step 5. Most packaged malware I've seen includes a clipboard logger with keylogger.
– Nathan Goings
2 days ago
1
1
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
@NathanGoings It's not like there would be that many permutations. Checking every combination one by one seems trivial.
– JoL
2 days ago
|
show 4 more comments
up vote
5
down vote
There is one thing you can do on sites that allow it (Google being one): Use a "have" factor of authentication, such as TOTP or a mobile app to approve logins. You don't have to use 2FA - that can be your only factor. I have some of my non-critical servers set to allow password OR totp, so I can log in with one or the other, without needing both. While, as others pointed out, that doesn't make you completely secure (after you log in the attacker could disable input and do whatever they want now that you're logged in), it prevents disclosing any passwords.
add a comment |
up vote
5
down vote
There is one thing you can do on sites that allow it (Google being one): Use a "have" factor of authentication, such as TOTP or a mobile app to approve logins. You don't have to use 2FA - that can be your only factor. I have some of my non-critical servers set to allow password OR totp, so I can log in with one or the other, without needing both. While, as others pointed out, that doesn't make you completely secure (after you log in the attacker could disable input and do whatever they want now that you're logged in), it prevents disclosing any passwords.
add a comment |
up vote
5
down vote
up vote
5
down vote
There is one thing you can do on sites that allow it (Google being one): Use a "have" factor of authentication, such as TOTP or a mobile app to approve logins. You don't have to use 2FA - that can be your only factor. I have some of my non-critical servers set to allow password OR totp, so I can log in with one or the other, without needing both. While, as others pointed out, that doesn't make you completely secure (after you log in the attacker could disable input and do whatever they want now that you're logged in), it prevents disclosing any passwords.
There is one thing you can do on sites that allow it (Google being one): Use a "have" factor of authentication, such as TOTP or a mobile app to approve logins. You don't have to use 2FA - that can be your only factor. I have some of my non-critical servers set to allow password OR totp, so I can log in with one or the other, without needing both. While, as others pointed out, that doesn't make you completely secure (after you log in the attacker could disable input and do whatever they want now that you're logged in), it prevents disclosing any passwords.
answered 2 days ago
Duncan X Simpson
230110
230110
add a comment |
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
The best way to protect yourself is to tell the person that you are not comfortable entering your password at their computer.
If you have probable cause or general paranoia then do not perform unsafe actions.
Expecting to thoroughly detect and/or mitigate all threat models in a matter of seconds is ludicrous.
What is the threat model anyways? Do you not trust the person? Do you not trust the computer? Are you trying to prevent their access from the particular website which you are logging in to? Are you trying to prevent the discovery of your password because you use it for a hundred other services such as personal banking? Are you simply trying to figure out a universal way to not be compromised regardless of which foreign computer you encounter in the future? Are you trying to prevent the details of the post-login screen from being recorded? You may wish to sweep the area for any hidden video recording devices in the ceiling.
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
The best way to protect yourself is to tell the person that you are not comfortable entering your password at their computer.
If you have probable cause or general paranoia then do not perform unsafe actions.
Expecting to thoroughly detect and/or mitigate all threat models in a matter of seconds is ludicrous.
What is the threat model anyways? Do you not trust the person? Do you not trust the computer? Are you trying to prevent their access from the particular website which you are logging in to? Are you trying to prevent the discovery of your password because you use it for a hundred other services such as personal banking? Are you simply trying to figure out a universal way to not be compromised regardless of which foreign computer you encounter in the future? Are you trying to prevent the details of the post-login screen from being recorded? You may wish to sweep the area for any hidden video recording devices in the ceiling.
add a comment |
up vote
2
down vote
up vote
2
down vote
The best way to protect yourself is to tell the person that you are not comfortable entering your password at their computer.
If you have probable cause or general paranoia then do not perform unsafe actions.
Expecting to thoroughly detect and/or mitigate all threat models in a matter of seconds is ludicrous.
What is the threat model anyways? Do you not trust the person? Do you not trust the computer? Are you trying to prevent their access from the particular website which you are logging in to? Are you trying to prevent the discovery of your password because you use it for a hundred other services such as personal banking? Are you simply trying to figure out a universal way to not be compromised regardless of which foreign computer you encounter in the future? Are you trying to prevent the details of the post-login screen from being recorded? You may wish to sweep the area for any hidden video recording devices in the ceiling.
The best way to protect yourself is to tell the person that you are not comfortable entering your password at their computer.
If you have probable cause or general paranoia then do not perform unsafe actions.
Expecting to thoroughly detect and/or mitigate all threat models in a matter of seconds is ludicrous.
What is the threat model anyways? Do you not trust the person? Do you not trust the computer? Are you trying to prevent their access from the particular website which you are logging in to? Are you trying to prevent the discovery of your password because you use it for a hundred other services such as personal banking? Are you simply trying to figure out a universal way to not be compromised regardless of which foreign computer you encounter in the future? Are you trying to prevent the details of the post-login screen from being recorded? You may wish to sweep the area for any hidden video recording devices in the ceiling.
edited yesterday
answered yesterday
MonkeyZeus
268210
268210
add a comment |
add a comment |
up vote
1
down vote
If you need to login using someone else's computer, there is no certain way to know for certain if there is any form of spying software. Even if it is someone you trust, they could be infected with a virus or a similar nefarious device, and it can be hard to impossible to know if it is infected. Always assume that a nefarious entity will still be able to view/access anything that happens on the computer. Here are a few ways you can try to mitigate the risks.
There is no possible way to ensure that the person's OS is not compromised. You can look at the running processes, examine call stacks, network requests or anything, but spyware programs can be extremely well disguised. The best possible solution is to boot from a live USB stick using a linux distribution such as Ubuntu, puppy linux or Kali linux. This means that you should have full control of the software running on the computer, although a determined hacker could insert malicious code into the BIOS or bootloader of the computer, changing the actual code of the operating system.
Mitigation of Hardware based vulnerabilities
- Check the cable between the computer and the display. A device can be inserted in between them allowing a hacker to see the display output.
- Avoid using a wireless keyboard or mouse. The signal can be intercepted between the transmitter and receiver, exposing keystrokes and mouse movements, even via a separate device.
- Plug any USB devices directly into the motherboard. Don't use a PCIe slot, as the device could be storing/transmitting keystrokes/commands. The same applies to front panel connectors.
- Use a different keyboard, if possible. Devices can take the sounds of individual keys being pressed to decipher which key it was. Unplug any microphones connected to the computer, just in case.
- Look to see if there are any extra PCIe or serial port devices plugged in. Ensure only the required ones are plugged in, just in case.
Software methods of decreasing the risk
- Ensure you connect to a secured WiFi network, or ethernet, if you know it is safe. It is probably better to use mobile data, and a mobile hotspot, if possible, so you don't have to rely on their internet connection. Use a USB cable as well, if possible, so you don't run the risk of an alternative WiFi connection intercepting the signal instead.
- Use SSL. This is obvious, but you must ensure the certificate authority is the one that you would expect to see, as it is possible for an entity to insert a self-signed certificate into the chain.
The last thing is that you should, if possible, temporarily change your password (maybe using your phone) while you login using that computer, then change it back afterwards, so if the password is compromised, it will not be usable after it is changed back.
New contributor
An Epic Person is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
add a comment |
up vote
1
down vote
If you need to login using someone else's computer, there is no certain way to know for certain if there is any form of spying software. Even if it is someone you trust, they could be infected with a virus or a similar nefarious device, and it can be hard to impossible to know if it is infected. Always assume that a nefarious entity will still be able to view/access anything that happens on the computer. Here are a few ways you can try to mitigate the risks.
There is no possible way to ensure that the person's OS is not compromised. You can look at the running processes, examine call stacks, network requests or anything, but spyware programs can be extremely well disguised. The best possible solution is to boot from a live USB stick using a linux distribution such as Ubuntu, puppy linux or Kali linux. This means that you should have full control of the software running on the computer, although a determined hacker could insert malicious code into the BIOS or bootloader of the computer, changing the actual code of the operating system.
Mitigation of Hardware based vulnerabilities
- Check the cable between the computer and the display. A device can be inserted in between them allowing a hacker to see the display output.
- Avoid using a wireless keyboard or mouse. The signal can be intercepted between the transmitter and receiver, exposing keystrokes and mouse movements, even via a separate device.
- Plug any USB devices directly into the motherboard. Don't use a PCIe slot, as the device could be storing/transmitting keystrokes/commands. The same applies to front panel connectors.
- Use a different keyboard, if possible. Devices can take the sounds of individual keys being pressed to decipher which key it was. Unplug any microphones connected to the computer, just in case.
- Look to see if there are any extra PCIe or serial port devices plugged in. Ensure only the required ones are plugged in, just in case.
Software methods of decreasing the risk
- Ensure you connect to a secured WiFi network, or ethernet, if you know it is safe. It is probably better to use mobile data, and a mobile hotspot, if possible, so you don't have to rely on their internet connection. Use a USB cable as well, if possible, so you don't run the risk of an alternative WiFi connection intercepting the signal instead.
- Use SSL. This is obvious, but you must ensure the certificate authority is the one that you would expect to see, as it is possible for an entity to insert a self-signed certificate into the chain.
The last thing is that you should, if possible, temporarily change your password (maybe using your phone) while you login using that computer, then change it back afterwards, so if the password is compromised, it will not be usable after it is changed back.
New contributor
An Epic Person is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
add a comment |
up vote
1
down vote
up vote
1
down vote
If you need to login using someone else's computer, there is no certain way to know for certain if there is any form of spying software. Even if it is someone you trust, they could be infected with a virus or a similar nefarious device, and it can be hard to impossible to know if it is infected. Always assume that a nefarious entity will still be able to view/access anything that happens on the computer. Here are a few ways you can try to mitigate the risks.
There is no possible way to ensure that the person's OS is not compromised. You can look at the running processes, examine call stacks, network requests or anything, but spyware programs can be extremely well disguised. The best possible solution is to boot from a live USB stick using a linux distribution such as Ubuntu, puppy linux or Kali linux. This means that you should have full control of the software running on the computer, although a determined hacker could insert malicious code into the BIOS or bootloader of the computer, changing the actual code of the operating system.
Mitigation of Hardware based vulnerabilities
- Check the cable between the computer and the display. A device can be inserted in between them allowing a hacker to see the display output.
- Avoid using a wireless keyboard or mouse. The signal can be intercepted between the transmitter and receiver, exposing keystrokes and mouse movements, even via a separate device.
- Plug any USB devices directly into the motherboard. Don't use a PCIe slot, as the device could be storing/transmitting keystrokes/commands. The same applies to front panel connectors.
- Use a different keyboard, if possible. Devices can take the sounds of individual keys being pressed to decipher which key it was. Unplug any microphones connected to the computer, just in case.
- Look to see if there are any extra PCIe or serial port devices plugged in. Ensure only the required ones are plugged in, just in case.
Software methods of decreasing the risk
- Ensure you connect to a secured WiFi network, or ethernet, if you know it is safe. It is probably better to use mobile data, and a mobile hotspot, if possible, so you don't have to rely on their internet connection. Use a USB cable as well, if possible, so you don't run the risk of an alternative WiFi connection intercepting the signal instead.
- Use SSL. This is obvious, but you must ensure the certificate authority is the one that you would expect to see, as it is possible for an entity to insert a self-signed certificate into the chain.
The last thing is that you should, if possible, temporarily change your password (maybe using your phone) while you login using that computer, then change it back afterwards, so if the password is compromised, it will not be usable after it is changed back.
New contributor
An Epic Person is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
If you need to login using someone else's computer, there is no certain way to know for certain if there is any form of spying software. Even if it is someone you trust, they could be infected with a virus or a similar nefarious device, and it can be hard to impossible to know if it is infected. Always assume that a nefarious entity will still be able to view/access anything that happens on the computer. Here are a few ways you can try to mitigate the risks.
There is no possible way to ensure that the person's OS is not compromised. You can look at the running processes, examine call stacks, network requests or anything, but spyware programs can be extremely well disguised. The best possible solution is to boot from a live USB stick using a linux distribution such as Ubuntu, puppy linux or Kali linux. This means that you should have full control of the software running on the computer, although a determined hacker could insert malicious code into the BIOS or bootloader of the computer, changing the actual code of the operating system.
Mitigation of Hardware based vulnerabilities
- Check the cable between the computer and the display. A device can be inserted in between them allowing a hacker to see the display output.
- Avoid using a wireless keyboard or mouse. The signal can be intercepted between the transmitter and receiver, exposing keystrokes and mouse movements, even via a separate device.
- Plug any USB devices directly into the motherboard. Don't use a PCIe slot, as the device could be storing/transmitting keystrokes/commands. The same applies to front panel connectors.
- Use a different keyboard, if possible. Devices can take the sounds of individual keys being pressed to decipher which key it was. Unplug any microphones connected to the computer, just in case.
- Look to see if there are any extra PCIe or serial port devices plugged in. Ensure only the required ones are plugged in, just in case.
Software methods of decreasing the risk
- Ensure you connect to a secured WiFi network, or ethernet, if you know it is safe. It is probably better to use mobile data, and a mobile hotspot, if possible, so you don't have to rely on their internet connection. Use a USB cable as well, if possible, so you don't run the risk of an alternative WiFi connection intercepting the signal instead.
- Use SSL. This is obvious, but you must ensure the certificate authority is the one that you would expect to see, as it is possible for an entity to insert a self-signed certificate into the chain.
The last thing is that you should, if possible, temporarily change your password (maybe using your phone) while you login using that computer, then change it back afterwards, so if the password is compromised, it will not be usable after it is changed back.
New contributor
An Epic Person is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
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answered 14 hours ago
An Epic Person
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add a comment |
add a comment |
up vote
0
down vote
When you suspect the system is keylogged you would need to be able to interrupt that process to do what you are asking.
That might be a visible process though - so if it's mission critical try finding that process or creating another user account with an encrypted terminal in a sandbox to see if you can avoid logging that way - i.e. Linux with encrypted home folder & swap as an example.
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
|
show 2 more comments
up vote
0
down vote
When you suspect the system is keylogged you would need to be able to interrupt that process to do what you are asking.
That might be a visible process though - so if it's mission critical try finding that process or creating another user account with an encrypted terminal in a sandbox to see if you can avoid logging that way - i.e. Linux with encrypted home folder & swap as an example.
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
|
show 2 more comments
up vote
0
down vote
up vote
0
down vote
When you suspect the system is keylogged you would need to be able to interrupt that process to do what you are asking.
That might be a visible process though - so if it's mission critical try finding that process or creating another user account with an encrypted terminal in a sandbox to see if you can avoid logging that way - i.e. Linux with encrypted home folder & swap as an example.
When you suspect the system is keylogged you would need to be able to interrupt that process to do what you are asking.
That might be a visible process though - so if it's mission critical try finding that process or creating another user account with an encrypted terminal in a sandbox to see if you can avoid logging that way - i.e. Linux with encrypted home folder & swap as an example.
answered yesterday
user192527
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
|
show 2 more comments
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
1
1
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
How would a sandboxed process or an encrypted home directory defeat keylogging?
– forest
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
I suggested interrupting the keylogging process - If the process monitored one user account and another account were encrypted - it might accomplish the desired result of not being logged. Attempting this in a sandboxed environment rather than just doing it cuts down on the risk in case it doesn't.
– user192527
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
If you are running under a different user, then there's no need to encrypt anything or use sandboxes. For Linux (since you mentioned Linux), individual users are isolated from each other and X11-based keyloggers will not work. However, if the hardware is controlled by someone malicious, then even encryption and a sandboxed terminal wouldn't help.
– forest
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
I suggested testing the idea in a sandbox. The main goal is to interrupt the keylogger if possible and if not to try to obfuscate by using other accounts etc.
– user192527
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
Unfortunately, sandboxing does not isolate the X11 protocol.
– forest
yesterday
|
show 2 more comments
up vote
-9
down vote
Just open that website or form in an Incognito window of chrome. Press Ctrl+shift+N to open and if the dialogue appears to save password click No. Simple as that.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
-9
down vote
Just open that website or form in an Incognito window of chrome. Press Ctrl+shift+N to open and if the dialogue appears to save password click No. Simple as that.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
add a comment |
up vote
-9
down vote
up vote
-9
down vote
Just open that website or form in an Incognito window of chrome. Press Ctrl+shift+N to open and if the dialogue appears to save password click No. Simple as that.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Just open that website or form in an Incognito window of chrome. Press Ctrl+shift+N to open and if the dialogue appears to save password click No. Simple as that.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
answered yesterday
Salman
1
1
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
New contributor
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
Salman is a new contributor to this site. Take care in asking for clarification, commenting, and answering.
Check out our Code of Conduct.
7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
add a comment |
7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
7
7
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
Downvoted because this answer is actually not correct! There are many more risks involved (most significantly, spyware such as keyloggers).
– Kevin Voorn
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
It was a generic, practical solution that u can do while u have access to a PC for short period in urgency. Ofc it's not full proof solution in case where u have to time to research on someone's computer to look for spyware. Why did u even enter such information on someone else's computer if it is so critical.
– Salman
yesterday
3
3
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
Welcome to the site. I'd remind you to take the tour. Sure, this is better than nothing. You have said it is "not full proof", however, your answer still says "Just x (...) simple as that", which sells the idea tht doing this is enough. Please notice that OP explicitly mentions keystroke logging, Incognito does not protect against that. Thus, using Incognito is wrong answer here. I'd remind you that you can edit your answer to add clarifications or improve it in any other way.
– Theraot
yesterday
3
3
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
incognito windows are not sandboxed
– Andrei
yesterday
3
3
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
Two problems with this answer. You do not describe why incognito mode will help, and if you knew that there were risks to consider, then those should at least be mentioned at some point because the question asks for it. And that is besides the point that I'm not sure how incognito mode is a solution to the problem.
– schroeder♦
yesterday
add a comment |
today is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
today is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
today is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
today is a new contributor. Be nice, and check out our Code of Conduct.
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8
Can you create a virtual machine on their box?
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
4
@DarkMatter Unfortunately, no. I am not allowed to do that. Even if I am allowed, I guess it would take some time (> 15 min) to do that and they don't have enough patience :) Although, I am interested to know how that helps. Please include it as an answer if you would like.
– today
2 days ago
4
it all depends on how they are monitoring your activity... operating inside of your own clean VM on their box (using a clean OSK) will bypass a number of the ways they could monitor your activity. Furthermore you can also delete the VM afterward to further remove evidence of your activities. Ultimately though if they own the hardware in theory there is no way to be bullet-proof (2FA helps some to mitigate ramifications of their monitoring)
– DarkMatter
2 days ago
25
A live OS (booted via USB or DVD) is probably more handy. However that won't protect you from hardware keyloggers for example. The best solution seems to be what Cowthulhu suggested in the answer, 2FA, when available. Also maybe change password and force a logout on all devices once you are back home on your computer, if the service makes this possible. A lot of this also depends on how knowledgeable and determined is your "enemy".
– reed
2 days ago
2
A simple option is after you're finished to use your phone to change your password. In the past, some services had the ability to generate a one-time login password from your phone, but these seem to have fallen out of favour, presumably with 2FA taking their place.
– paj28
2 days ago